We define and analyze the security of a blockcipher mode of operation, CLOC, for provably secure authenticated encryption with associated data. The design of CLOC aims at optimizing previous schemes, CCM, EAX, and EAX-prime, in terms of the implementation overhead beyond the blockcipher, the precomputation complexity, and the memory requirement. With these features, CLOC is suitable for handling short input data, say 16 bytes, without needing precomputation nor large memory. This property is especially beneficial to small microprocessors, where the word size is typically 8 bits or 16 bits, and there are significant restrictions in the size and the number of registers. CLOC uses a variant of CFB mode in its encryption part and a variant of CBC MAC in the authentication part. We introduce various design techniques in order to achieve the above mentioned design goals. We prove CLOC secure, in a reduction-based provable security paradigm, under the assumption that the blockcipher is a pseudorandom permutation. We also present our preliminary implementation results.
Introduction
Background. An authenticated encryption with associated data scheme (AEAD) is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive that provides both confidentiality and integrity of plaintexts, and integrity of associated data. There are several ways of designing AEADs, and we focus on a design based on a blockcipher. CCM [39] was proposed by Whiting, Housley, and Ferguson for use within the IEEE 802.11 standard for Wireless LANs. It is adopted as NIST recommendation [17] , and is broadly used in practice [21, 22, 9] . The mode is 2-pass, meaning that we run two algorithms, one for encryption and one for authentication. It is provably secure [25] , but CCM suffers from a number of limitations, most notably it is not on-line; the encryption process cannot be started until knowing the whole input data. There are other issues in CCM [35] , and EAX was proposed by Bellare, Rogaway, and Wagner to overcome these limitations [13] . EAX is included in ISO 19772 [9] , and it has a number of attractive features; it is simple as it uses CMAC and CTR mode in a black-box manner, and it was designed by taking provable security into consideration. However, it has several implementation costs, and EAX-prime was designed by Moise, Beroset, Phinney, and Burns [31] to reduce the costs. It was designed to reduce the number of blockcipher calls both in precomputation and in processing the input data, to eliminate the key dependent constants, also called masks, to reduce memory requirement to store them, and to unify the associated data and the nonce, which contributes to reduce the memory requirement and the number of blockcipher calls as well. However, a practical attack was pointed out against EAX-prime [30] , showing that it is not a secure AEAD. Later, Minematsu, Lucks, and Iwata proposed a variant of EAX called EAX + , which has similar complexity as EAX-prime and is provably secure as EAX [29] .
Presumably, though not clearly stated in the document [31] , the most significant advantage of EAXprime over original EAX (and CCM) is its efficient handling of short input data with small memory. As EAX-prime needs only one blockcipher call in precomputation whereas EAX needs three calls, EAXprime gains the performance for short (say 16 bytes) input data, in particular if precomputation is difficult due to a limited amount of memory, or frequent key changes, or both. The performance for short input data is important for many practical applications, most notably for low-power wireless sensor networks, since messages are typically short to suppress the energy consumption of sensor nodes, which [25] O(2 n/2 ) [24] O(2 n/2 ) [13] O(1) [30] O(2 n/2 ) [26] O(2 n/2 ) N-AUTH⋄ ≪ 2 n/2 [20, 19] O(1) [19] O (1) [19] O (1) [30] O (1) [19] O(2 n/2 ) • "Setup" shows the number of blockcipher calls for setup, "Static AD" shows if efficient handling of static associated data is possible, "Parallel" shows if the blockcipher calls are parallelizable, and "Primitive" shows the components of the mode. E is the encryption of the blockcipher and D is the decryption. † May have additional one call ‡ Plus a + m multiplications over GF(2 n ) ⋆ Attack workload of nonce-respecting adversaries to break the privacy notion or the authenticity notion ⋄ Attack workload of nonce-reusing adversaries to break the authenticity notion
Preliminaries
Let {0, 1} * be the set of all finite bit strings, including the empty string ε. For an integer ℓ ≥ 0, let {0, 1} ℓ be the set of all bit strings of ℓ bits. For X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * , we write X ∥ Y , (X, Y ), or simply XY to denote their concatenation. For ℓ ≥ 0, we write 0 ℓ ∈ {0, 1} ℓ to denote the bit string that consists of ℓ zeros, and 1 ℓ ∈ {0, 1} ℓ to denote the bit string that consists of ℓ ones. For X ∈ {0, 1} * , |X| is its length in bits, and for ℓ ≥ 1, |X| ℓ = ⌈|X|/ℓ⌉ is the length in ℓ-bit blocks. For X ∈ {0, 1} * and ℓ ≥ 0 such that |X| ≥ ℓ, msb ℓ (X) is the most significant (the leftmost) ℓ bits of X. For instance we have msb 1 (1100) = 1 and msb 3 (1100) = 110. For X ∈ {0, 1} * and ℓ ≥ 1, we write its partition into ℓ-bit blocks as (X [1] , . . . , X[x]) ℓ ← X, which is defined as follows. If X = ε, then x = 1 and X [1] ℓ ← X, where X [1] = ε. Otherwise X [1] , . . . , X[x] ∈ {0, 1} * are unique bit strings such that X [1] ∥ · · · ∥ X[x] = X, |X[1]| = · · · = |X[x − 1]| = ℓ, and 1 ≤ |X[x]| ≤ ℓ.
In what follows, we fix a block length n and a blockcipher E : K E × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , where K E is a non-empty set of keys. Let Perm(n) be the set of all permutations over {0, 1} n . We write E K ∈ Perm(n) for the permutation specified by K ∈ K E , and C = E K (M ) for the ciphertext of plaintext M ∈ {0, 1} n under key K ∈ K E .
CLOC-E and CLOC-D are defined in Fig. 1 . In these algorithms, we use four subroutines, HASH, PRF, ENC, and DEC. They have the following syntax.
These subroutines are defined in Fig. 2 , and illustrated in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 , and Fig. 5 . We also present equivalent figures in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 , and Fig. 8 , where it is easier to see that CLOC works with small state. In the figures, i is the identity function, and i(X) = X for all X ∈ {0, 1} n . In the subroutines, we use the one-zero padding function ozp : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * , the bit-fixing functions fix0, fix1 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * , and five tweak functions f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , and h, which are functions over {0, 1} n . The one-zero padding function ozp is used to adjust the length of an input string so that the total length becomes a positive multiple of n bits. For X ∈ {0, 1} * , ozp(X) is defined as ozp(X) = X if |X| = ℓn for some ℓ ≥ 1, and ozp(X) = X ∥ 10 n−1−(|X| mod n) otherwise. We note that ozp(ε) = 10 n−1 , and we also note that, in general, the function is not invertible.
The bit-fixing functions fix0 and fix1 are used to fix the most significant bit of an input string to zero and one, respectively. For X ∈ {0, 1} * , fix0(X) is defined as fix0(X) = X ∧ 01 |X|−1 , and fix1(X) is defined as fix1(X) = X ∨ 10 |X|−1 , where ∧ and ∨ are the bit-wise AND operation, and the bit-wise OR operation, respectively.
The tweak function h is used in HASH if the most significant bit of ozp(A [1] ) is zero. We use f 1 and f 2 in HASH and PRF, where f 1 is used if the last input block is full (i.e., if |A[a]| = n or |C[m]| = n) and f 2 is used otherwise. We use g 1 and g 2 in PRF, where we use g 1 if the second argument of the input is the empty string (i.e., |C| = 0), and otherwise we use g 2 . Now for X ∈ {0, 1} n , let (X [1] , X[2], X [3] , X [4] )
Then f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , and h are defined as follows. [3] , X [4] , X[1, 2]) g 1 (X) = (X [3] , X [4] , X [1, 2] , X[2, 3]) g 2 (X) = (X[2], X [3] , X [4] , X [1, 2] ) h(X) = (X [1, 2] , X[2, 3], X [3, 4] , X [1, 2, 4] )
Alternatively the tweak functions can be specified by a matrix. Let
be a 4 × 4 binary matrix, and let M i for i ≥ 0 be exponentiations of M, where M 0 denotes the identity matrix. Then we have f 1 (X) = X·M 8 , f 2 (X) = X·M, g 1 (X) = X·M 2 , g 2 (X) = X·M, and h(X) = X·M 4 , where X = (X[1], X[2], X [3] , X [4] ) is interpreted as a vector. The design rationale for the tweak functions is explained in Sect. 4.
Design Rationale
Overall Structure. At abstract level CLOC is a straightforward combination of CFB and CBC MAC, where CBC MAC is called twice for processing associated data and a ciphertext, and CFB is called once to generate a ciphertext. However, when we want to achieve low-overhead computation and small memory consumption, we found that any other combination of a basic encryption mode and a MAC mode did not work. For instance, we could not use CTR or OFB, as they require one state block in processing a plaintext to hold a counter value or a blockcipher output. We then realized that combining CFB and CBC MAC was not an easy task. Since we avoid using two keys or using blockcipher pre-calls, such as L = E K (0 n ) used in EAX, we could not computationally separate CFB and CBC MAC via input masking, such as Galois-field doubling (2 i L for the i-th block, where 2L denotes the multiplication of 2 and L in GF(2 n )) [13, 33] . This implies that CFB leaks input and output pairs of the blockcipher calls, which can be freely used to guess or fake the internal chaining value of CBC MAC, leading to a break of the scheme. Lucks [28] proposed an AEAD scheme based on CFB, called CCFB. However, the problem is not relevant to CCFB due to the difference in the global structure. To overcome this obstacle in composition, we introduced the bit-fixing functions. Their role is to absolutely separate the input blocks of CFB and the first input block of CBC MAC. This imposes the most significant one bit of the input of CBC MAC being fixed to 0, implying one-bit input loss. The set of five tweak functions, which is another tool we introduced in this paper, is used to compensate for this information loss. It also works to compensate the information loss caused by padding functions applied to the last input block to CBC MAC. A similar technique can be found in literature [32, 40] , however, the previous works only considered MACs and the tweak functions required bit operations. In the following we explain the specific requirements for the tweak functions.
Definition of f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , and h. These functions are defined to meet the following properties. First, they have the additive property. That is, for any z ∈ {f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , h}, we have z(X ⊕ X ′ ) = z(X) ⊕ z(X ′ ) for all X, X ′ ∈ {0, 1} n . Next, these functions are invertible over {0, 1} n . For any z ∈ {f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , h}, we have z ∈ Perm(n). Finally, they satisfy the differential probability constraints specified in Fig. 9 . Let z be a function in Fig. 9 . Then we require that, for any Y ∈ {0, 1} n , Pr[z(K) = Y ] = 1/2 n , where the probability is taken over K $ ← {0, 1} n . When z is of the form z = z ′ ⊕ z ′′ , then z(K) stands for z ′ (K) ⊕ z ′′ (K). When z is of the form z = z ′ z ′′ , then z(K) stands for z ′ (z ′′ (K)). Recall that we define i as i(K) = K.
Choosing Tweak Functions. Finding simple and word-wise tweak functions fulfilling all properties is not a trivial task. We start with matrix M of (1), which is invertible and has order 15 (i.e. M 15 = M 0 ), and test all combinations of the form (f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , h) = (i 1 , . . . , i 5 ) ∈ {1, . . . , 14} 5 , where i 1 = 2 means f 1 (X) = X · M 2 , using a computer. There are 864 candidates out of 537,824 fulfilling the differential probability constraints of Fig. 9 . The complexity increases as the index of M grows, when we implement the tweak function by iterating M, which seems suitable for hardware. For software we would directly implement M i using a word-wise permutation and xor, and in this case we observe slight irregular, but similar phenomena (e.g. M 1 needs one xor while M 3 needs three xor's). Fig. 10 shows M i and the Feistellike implementations using a word-wise permutation and xor. It shows that, except for M 5 and M 10 , we have a simple implementation using at most four xor's. Based on these observations, we simply define the cost of computing M i as i, and define f cost (i 1 , . . . , i 5 ) as
) This corresponds to the expected total cost for given (i 1 , . . . , i 5 ), where associated data and a plaintext are assumed to be non-empty byte strings of random lengths (as we expect the standard use of CLOC is AEAD, not MAC), and we also assume that the most significant bit of the associated data is random. Then there remains only two candidates giving the minimum value of f cost , which are (i 1 , . . . , i 5 ) = (8, 1, 2, 1, 4) and (8, 1, 6, 1, 4) . As smaller i 3 is better, we choose the former as the sole winner. We also tested other matrices, say the one replacing the forth column of M by the transposition of (1, 0, 1, 0), but no better solution was found. We note that M 8 = M 2 ⊕ M 0 and M 4 = M 1 ⊕ M 0 hold, implying that we have f 1 (X) = g 1 (X) ⊕ X and h(X) = f 2 (X) ⊕ X = g 2 (X) ⊕ X, which may be useful in some implementations.
Security of CLOC
In this section, we define the security notions of a blockcipher and CLOC, and present our security theorems.
PRP Notion. We assume that the blockcipher E : K E × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a pseudo-random permutation, or a PRP [27] . We say that P is a random permutation if P $ ← Perm(n), and define
where the first probability is taken over K $ ← K E and the randomness of A, and the last is over P $ ← Perm(n) and A. We write CLOC[Perm(n), ℓ N , τ ] for CLOC that uses P as E K , and the encryption and decryption algorithms are written as CLOC-E P and CLOC-D P . We also consider CLOC that uses a random function as E K , which is naturally defined as the invertibility of E K is irrelevant in the definition of CLOC. Let Rand(n) be the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n , and we say that R is a random function if R $ ← Rand(n). We write CLOC[Rand(n), ℓ N , τ ] for CLOC that uses R as E K , and its encryption and decryption algorithms are written as CLOC-E R and CLOC-D R .
Privacy Notion. We define the privacy notion for CLOC[E, ℓ N , τ ] = (CLOC-E, CLOC-D). This notion captures the indistinguishably of a nonce-respecting adversary in a chosen plaintext attack setting. We consider an adversary A that has access to the CLOC encryption oracle, or a random-bits oracle. The encryption oracle takes (N,
We define the privacy advantage as
where the first probability is taken over K $ ← K CLOC and the randomness of A, and the last is over the random-bits oracle and A. We assume that A in the privacy game is nonce-respecting, that is, A does not make two queries with the same nonce.
Privacy Theorem. Let A be an adversary that makesueries, and suppose that the queries are
Then we define the total associated data length as a 1 + · · · + a q , and the total plaintext length as m 1 
We have the following information theoretic result. Theorem 1. Let Perm(n), ℓ N , and τ be the parameters of CLOC. Let A be an adversary that makes at mostueries, where the total associated data length is at most σ A , and the total plaintext length is at most σ M . Then we have Adv priv CLOC[Perm(n),ℓN ,τ ] (A) ≤ 5σ 2 priv /2 n , where σ priv = q + σ A + 2σ M . A proof overview is given in Sect. 6, and a complete proof is presented in Appendix A. If we use a blockcipher E, which is secure in the sense of the PRP notion, instead of Perm(n), then the corresponding complexity theoretic result can be shown by a standard argument. See e.g. [11] . We note that the privacy of CLOC is broken if the nonce is reused.
Authenticity Notion. We next define the authenticity notion, which captures the unforgeability of an adversary in a chosen ciphertext attack setting. We consider a strong adversary that can repeat the same nonce multiple times. Let A be an adversary that has access to the CLOC encryption oracle and the CLOC decryption oracle. The encryption oracle is defined as above. The decryption oracle takes
The authenticity advantage is defined as
where the probability is taken over K $ ← K CLOC and the randomness of A, and the adversary forges if the decryption oracle returns a bit string (other than ⊥) for a query (N, A, C, T ), but (C, T ) was not previously returned to A from the encryption oracle for a query (N, A, M ). The adversary A in the authenticity game is not necessarily nonce-respecting, and A can make two or more queries with the same nonce. Specifically, A can repeat using the same nonce for encryption queries, a nonce used for encryption queries can be used for decryption queries and vice-versa, and the same nonce can be repeated for decryption queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that A does not make trivial queries, i.e., if the encryption oracle returns (C, T ) for a query (N, A, M ), then A does not make a query (N, A, C, T ) to the decryption oracle, and A does not repeat a query.
Authenticity Theorem. Let A be an adversary that makes q encryption queries and q ′ decryption queries.
be the decryption queries. Then we define the total associated data length in encryption queries as a 1 + · · · + a q , the total plaintext length as m 1 + · · · + m q , the total associated data length in decryption queries as a ′ 1 + · · · + a ′ q ′ , and the total ciphertext length as m ′
We have the following information theoretic result.
Theorem 2. Let Perm(n), ℓ N , and τ be the parameters of CLOC. Let A be an adversary that makes at most q encryption queries and at most q ′ decryption queries, where the total associated data length in encryption queries is at most σ A , the total plaintext length is at most σ M , the total associated data length in decryption queries is at most σ A ′ , and the total ciphertext length is at most σ C ′ . Then we have
A proof overview is given in Sect. 6, and a complete proof is presented in Appendix A. As in the privacy case, if we use a blockcipher E secure in the sense of the PRP notion, then we obtain the corresponding complexity theoretic result by a standard argument in, e.g., [11] .
Overview of Security Proofs
PRP/PRF Switching. The first step is to replace the random permutation P in CLOC[Perm(n), ℓ N , τ ] with a random function R, and use the PRP/PRF switching lemma [12] to obtain the following differences.
{
Defining Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 and CLOC2. We define twenty six functions Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 : 26 ) as oracles. Q and CLOC2 are designed so that CLOC-E R and CLOC2-E Q are the same algorithms, CLOC-D R and CLOC2-D Q are the same algorithms (except that CLOC2-D Q is used for the verification only, and it does not output a plaintext even if the verification succeeds), and Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 are indistinguishable from F 1 , . . . , F 26 , which are independent random functions. We then have
and we show the distinguishing probability of Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 ) and F = (F 1 , . . . , F 26 ) in Lemma 1. However, the indistinguishability does not hold for arbitrary adversaries. We formalize an input-respecting adversary, and our indistinguishability result in Lemma 1 holds only for these adversaries.
The three random strings, K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 , are secret keys from the adversary's perspective, and we introduce them to show the indistinguishability between Q and F . For instance we know that the input Fig. 2) , and hence we can safely assume that they are independent. Likewise, we show that the collision probability between fix0(ozp(A[1])) and, say, Fig. 2) is low, and the three random strings are introduced to help this argument.
Defining CLOC3. We define another version of CLOC[Rand(n), ℓ N , τ ] called CLOC3[ℓ N , τ ]. It uses F = (F 1 , . . . , F 26 ) as oracles, and the encryption algorithm CLOC3-E F and the decryption algorithm CLOC3-D F are obtained from CLOC2-E Q and CLOC2-D Q by replacing Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 with F 1 , . . . , F 26 , respectively. We use Lemma 1 to obtain the following differences.
The simulations work with input-respecting adversaries, and hence Lemma 1 is sufficient for our purpose.
Indistinguishability of (HASH3, HASH3 ′ , HASH3 ′′ ). We then consider three subroutines HASH3, HASH3 ′ , and HASH3 ′′ in CLOC3[ℓ N , τ ]. HASH3 roughly corresponds to a function that computes S E [1] (N, A) ). HASH3 ′ computes the tag T when |C| = 0, i.e., this function roughly corresponds to msb τ (E K (g 1 (HASH K (N, A) ))). HASH3 ′′ computes S P [0] from (N, A), which is used when |C| ≥ 1, i.e., E K (g 2 (HASH K (N, A) )). Then in Lemma 2, we show that these functions are indistinguishable from three independent random functions HASH4, HASH4 ′ , and HASH4 ′′ .
. This is obtained by replacing HASH3, HASH3 ′ , and HASH3 ′′ in CLOC3 with HASH4, HASH4 ′ , and HASH4 ′′ , respectively. We use Lemma 2 to obtain the following differences.
Indistinguishability of PRF4. We then consider a subroutine called PRF4 in CLOC4. This function outputs a tag T from (N, A, C), and internally uses HASH4 ′ , HASH4 ′′ , F 24 , F 25 , and F 26 . We show in Lemma 3 that this function is indistinguishable from a random function PRF5.
, which is obtained from CLOC4 by replacing PRF4 with PRF5. This function is used in both encryption and decryption, and we obtain the following differences from Lemma 3.
Privacy and Authenticity of CLOC5. Finally, we analyze the privacy and the authenticity of CLOC5 in Lemma 4. The privacy result shows the upper bound on Adv priv CLOC5[ℓN ,τ ] (A), and the proof is reduced to bounding the collision probability among the input values of the random function which is used to encrypt plaintexts. The authenticity result shows the upper bound on Adv auth CLOC5[ℓN ,τ ] (A), and its proof is simple and the result is obtained from the fact that the adversary, even if the nonce is reused, has to guess the output of a random function PRF5 for the input that was not queried before.
We finally obtain the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 by combining the above differences between advantage functions.
Software Implementation
We first tested CLOC on a general-purpose CPU. It is interesting to note that the encryption process and tag generation can be done in parallel, which could speed up the overall computation by a factor close to 2 for long messages, then the final speed could be close to that of encryption only in serial mode. To show that, we implemented CLOC instantiated with AES-128 using the AES new instruction set, and tested against Intel processor, Core i5-3427U 1.80GHz [6] . It is known that Intel's AES instruction allows fast parallel processing (up to 4 or 8 blocks), and we used this technique for two parallel inputs to AES. The tested speed is around 4.9 cycles per byte (cpb), while AES-128 encrypts at a speed of 4.3 cpb in serial mode. In Table 2 , we provide the test vectors.
We then tested CLOC on embedded software. We used an 8-bit microprocessor, Atmel AVR AT-mega128 [2] . For comparison we also implemented EAX and OCB3 [26] . For OCB3 we used a byteoriented code from [7] . OCB3 needs relatively large precomputation for GF doublings, but we modify the code so that the doublings are on-line, since large precomputation may not be suitable to handle short input data for microprocessors. We also considered GCM for comparison, however, recent studies show that GCM does not perform well on constrained devices (see e.g. [10, 38] ), hence we decided not to include it. All modes are written in C and combined with AES-128. Our AES code is taken from [3] , which is written in assembler. AES runs at 156.7 cpb for encryption, 196.8 cpb for decryption, both without key scheduling, and the key scheduling runs at 1,979 cycles. Our codes are complied with Atmel Studio 6 available from [2] . Cycles counts are measured on the simulator of Atmel Studio 6. Table 3 shows the implementation result. ROM denotes the object size in bytes. The speed is measured based on the scenario of non-static associated data, i.e., we excluded key setup and other computations before processing associated data and nonce, defined as "Init", and figures for Data b denote cycles per byte to process a b-byte message with 16-byte associated data. For OCB3 we also measured the decryption performance, whereas those of CLOC and EAX are almost the same as encryption. The result shows a superior performance of CLOC for short input data, up to around 128 bytes, which would be sufficiently long for low-power wireless networks, as we mentioned in Sect. 1. We also measure the RAM usage of the AVR implementations, using a public tool [41] , based on data of 16 bytes. It is clear to see that CLOC requires much less RAM than OCB3. Due to an unknown reason, this tool is not able to tell the RAM usage for EAX.
Hardware Implementation
Although the primary focus of CLOC is embedded software, we also implemented CLOC on hardware to see basic performance figures. We used Altera FPGA, Cyclone IV GX (EP4CGX110DF31C7) [1] , and implemented CLOC using AES-128. AES implementation is round-based, and the S-box of AES is based on a composite field [37] . For reference we also wrote EAX for the same device, using the same AES. Both CLOC and EAX use one AES core for encryption and authentication. In EAX implementation, all input masks are stored to registers. Table 4 shows the results. The size is measured by the number of logic elements (LEs). Our implementation is not optimized. Still, these figures show that CLOC has slightly smaller size and faster speed than EAX. Table 4 lacks other important modes, in particular OCB. A more comprehensive comparison and optimized implementation for short input data are interesting future topics.
Conclusions
We presented a blockcipher mode of operation called CLOC for authenticated encryption with associated data. It uses a variant of CFB mode in its encryption part and a variant of CBC MAC in the authentication part. The scheme efficiently handles short input data without heavy precomputation nor large memory, and it is suitable for use in microprocessors. We proved CLOC secure, in a reduction-based provable security paradigm, under the assumption that the blockcipher is a pseudorandom permutation. We also presented our preliminary implementation results. It would be interesting to see improved implementation results using possibly lightweight blockciphers. 
since for a query (N 
For the authenticity notion, without loss of generality, we assume that the decryption oracle, if A succeeds in forgery, returns a bit 1 instead of the plaintext since the returned value has no effect on the success probability of A. Then for a decryption
In what follows, we evaluate Adv priv CLOC[Rand(n),ℓN ,τ ] (A) and Adv auth CLOC[Rand(n),ℓN ,τ ] (A).
Definition of Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 . Let R $ ← Rand(n) be a random function, and let K 1 , K 2 , K 3 $ ← {0, 1} n be three independent random n-bit strings. We define twenty six functions Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n based on R, K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 in Fig 11, and we write Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 ). It is based on Q, and the encryption algorithm CLOC2-E and the decryption algorithm CLOC2-D are presented in Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 . We also show figures of some of the subroutines used in these algorithms in Fig. 14, Fig. 15, Fig. 16 , and Fig. 17 . CLOC2-E and CLOC2-D take R, K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 as a key, but we write CLOC2-E Q and CLOC2-D Q , and we describe them using Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 ) as subroutines.
We briefly describe the intuition how CLOC2 works. There are three main subroutines, HASH2, ENC2, and PRF2.
-HASH2 takes N and A as input, and is used when |M | ≥ 1 to generate the first mask to encrypt
and M as input and it returns the ciphertext C. -PRF2 takes N , A, and C as input to return the tag T . This function is different from PRF in that, PRF takes V as a part of the input, which is a value that can be computed from N and A and is independent of C, but PRF2 directly computes the tag from N , A, and C. We use three functions in PRF2, which we call HASH2 ′ , HASH2 ′′ , and PRF2 ′ , and these functions are described below.
• HASH2 ′ is used when |C| = 0 to generate a tag T from N and A.
• HASH2 ′′ and PRF2 ′ are used when |C| ≥ 1 to generate a tag T . HASH2 ′′ takes N and A as input and computes a value that roughly corresponds to E K (g 2 (V )) of CLOC. Then PRF2 ′ takes the output of HASH2 ′′ and C as input to output the tag T .
We note that HASH2, HASH2 ′ , and HASH2 ′′ are almost the same algorithms except for the functions used to process the last input block (and hence they share a similar name). We use the name PRF2 as it is used to generate a tag, while we use the name PRF2 ′ as it roughly corresponds to PRF. Now with careful scrutiny, we can verify that CLOC-E R and CLOC2-E Q are exactly the same algorithms, and furthermore, CLOC-D R and CLOC2-D Q are the same algorithms, since K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 are Algorithm HASH2Q 1 ,...,Q 4 ,Q 11 ,...,Q 16 (N, A)
if msb1(A[1]) = 0 then 10.
if a ≥ 3 then 19.
for i ← 3 to a − 1 do // only for a ≥ 4 20.
if |A[a]| = n then 23. ...,Q 10 ,Q 18 ,...,Q 26 (N, A, C) 1. if |C| = 0 then 2.
if msb1(ozp (A[1] )) = 0 then 5.
T ← msbτ (Q7(S H [1] ⊕ ozp(N ))) 6.
else
T (N, A) for 0 ≤ |A| ≤ n (left) and |A| ≥ n + 1 (right). The functions in parenthesis may not be executed depending on the input. Q 10 (N, A) for 0 ≤ |A| ≤ n (left) and |A| ≥ n + 1 (right). This function is used as a subroutine in PRF2 to generate a tag T when |C| = 0. 
(4)
Indistinguishability of Q. Next, let F 1 , . . . , F 26 $ ← Rand(n) be twenty six independent random functions, and we write F = (F 1 , . . . , F 26 ). We show that Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 ) is indistinguishable from F = (F 1 , . . . , F 26 ). For an adversary B, we define Adv ind Q (B) as
where the first probability is taken over R
1} n , and the randomness of B, and the last is over F 1 , . . . , F 26 $ ← Rand(n) and B. The adversary makes queries of the form (j, X) ∈ {1, . . . , 26}×{0, 1} n , and receives Q j (X) or F j (X). We say that the adversary is input-respecting if msb 1 (X) = 0 holds for all queries with j = 1, and msb 1 (X) = 1 holds for all queries with j = 17. Without loss of generality, we assume that B does not repeat a query. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let B be an input-respecting adversary that makes at most q queries. Then Adv
A proof is in Appendix B.
Definition of CLOC3. We define another version of CLOC[Rand
It is based on F , and the encryption algorithm CLOC3-E and the decryption algorithm CLOC3-D are the same as CLOC2-E and CLOC2-D, except that we use F 1 , . . . , F 26 instead of Q 1 , . . . , Q 26 , respectively. Therefore, CLOC3-E and CLOC3-D take F = (F 1 , . . . , F 26 ) as a key, and we write CLOC3-E F and CLOC3-D F . We write the subroutines in CLOC3-E F and CLOC3-D F as HASH3, HASH3 ′ , HASH3 ′′ , ENC3, PRF3, and PRF3 ′ , instead of HASH2, HASH2 ′ , HASH2 ′′ , ENC2, PRF2, and PRF2 ′ . From Lemma 1, we obtain 
since otherwise we can construct an input-respecting adversary B that contradicts Lemma 1.
Indistinguishability of (HASH3, HASH3 ′ , HASH3 ′′ ). Let HASH4, HASH4 ′ , and HASH4 ′′ be three independent random functions, where HASH4, HASH4 ′′ : N CLOC × A CLOC → {0, 1} n , and HASH4 ′ : N CLOC × A CLOC → T CLOC . We show that (HASH3, HASH3 ′ , HASH3 ′′ ) is indistinguishable from random functions (HASH4, HASH4 ′ , HASH4 ′′ ). For an adversary B, define Adv ind HASH3,HASH3 ′ ,HASH3 ′′ (B) as
where the first probability is taken over F 1 , . . . , F 16 , F 18 , . . . , F 23 $ ← Rand(n) and the randomness of B, and the last is over the randomness of HASH4, HASH4 ′ , HASH4 ′′ , and B. The adversary makes queries of the form (j, N, A) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × N CLOC × A CLOC , and receives HASH3(N, A) or HASH4(N, A) if j = 1, HASH3 ′ (N, A) or HASH4 ′ (N, A) if j = 2, and HASH3 ′′ (N, A) or HASH4 ′′ (N, A) if j = 3. If B makesueries and the queries are (j 1 , N 1 , A 1 ) , . . . , (j q , N q , A q ), then we define the total associated data length as a 1 + · · · + a q , where (A i [1] , . . . , A i [a i ]) n ← A i . Without loss of generality, we assume that B does not repeat a query, but the same nonce can be repeated across different queries. We show the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let B be an adversary that makes at mostueries, where the total associated data length is at most σ A . Then we have Adv ind HASH3,HASH3 ′ ,HASH3 ′′ (B) ≤ σ 2 A /2 n .
A proof is in Appendix C.
Definition of CLOC4. We define yet another version of CLOC[Rand(n), ℓ N , τ ] called CLOC4[ℓ N , τ ]. The encryption algorithm CLOC4-E and the decryption algorithm CLOC4-D are the same as CLOC3-E and CLOC3-D, respectively, except that we use random functions HASH4, HASH4 ′ , and HASH4 ′′ , instead of HASH3, HASH3 ′ , and HASH3 ′′ . Therefore, CLOC4-E and CLOC4-D take HASH4, HASH4 ′ , HASH4 ′′ , F 17 , F 24 , F 25 , and F 26 as a key, and we write their subroutines as ENC4, PRF4, and PRF4 ′ , instead of ENC3, PRF3, and PRF3 ′ . From Lemma 2, we obtain
To see this, for privacy, suppose that A makes a query (N i , A i , M i ). If |M i | = 0, then B makes a query (2, N i , A i ). If |M i | ≥ 1, then B makes a query (1, N i , A i ), and then (3, N i , A i ). For authenticity, B behaves as above for encryption queries. For a decryption query (
. Therefore, the total associated data length of B is no more than the twice of that of A.
Indistinguishability of PRF4. Recall that PRF4 : N CLOC × A CLOC × C CLOC → T CLOC takes HASH4 ′ , HASH4 ′′ , F 24 , F 25 , and F 26 as a key. Let PRF5 be a random function from N CLOC × A CLOC × C CLOC to T CLOC . We show that PRF4 is indistinguishable from PRF5. Let B be an adversary, and we define Adv ind PRF4 (B) as
where the first probability is taken over the randomness of HASH4 ′ , HASH4 ′′ , F 24 , F 25 , F 26 , and B, and the last is over the randomness of PRF5 and B. Suppose that B makesueries, and if the queries are (N 1 , A 1 , C 1 ) , . . . , (N q , A q , C q ), then we define the total ciphertext length as m 1 + · · · + m q , where
The same nonce can be repeated across different queries, but without loss of generality, we assume that B does not repeat a query. We show the following lemma. Lemma 3. Let B be an adversary that makes at mostueries, where the total ciphertext length is at most σ C . Then we have Adv ind PRF4 (B) ≤ 0.5q 2 /2 n + σ 2 C /2 n . A proof is in Appendix D.
Definition of CLOC5. We define our final version of CLOC[Rand(n), ℓ N , τ ], which we write CLOC5[ℓ N , τ ]. The encryption algorithm CLOC5-E and the decryption algorithm CLOC5-D are the same as CLOC4-E and CLOC4-D, respectively, except that we use a random function PRF5 instead of PRF4. We write HASH5 and ENC5 for HASH4 and ENC4. Then CLOC5-E and CLOC5-D take HASH5, PRF5, and F 17 as a key, where HASH5 : N CLOC × A CLOC → {0, 1} n , PRF5 : N CLOC × A CLOC × C CLOC → T CLOC , and F 17 : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n are all random functions. For reference, we present the specification in Fig. 18 .
Privacy and Authenticity of CLOC5. We have the following lemma on the privacy and the authenticity of CLOC5.
Proof (of Theorem 1). We are now ready to show our proof of Theorem 1. From (2), (4), (5), (6), (7) , and Lemma 4, we obtain 
If j ∈ J 1 , then we use the xor of K 1 in computing Q j (X). Similarly, we use K 2 when j ∈ J 2 , and K 3 when j ∈ J 3 . The input value of R when j ∈ J 4 is directly determined by the input value of the function itself. The absence of the bad event implies that the responses that B receives from the oracles are uniform and independent random bit strings, since the output values of R are all independent. Therefore, we have
We also see that, from the argument above, the adaptivity does not help in increasing the probability of the bad event. Therefore, we may fix all queries (j 1 , X 1 ), . . . , (j q , X q ) made by B, and evaluate the right hand side of (8) based on the randomness of K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 . Let (j, X), (j ′ , X ′ ) ∈ {(j 1 , X 1 ), . . . , (j q , X q )} be two distinct queries. If j = j ′ , then we have X ̸ = X ′ , and hence we never have I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ ) from the invertibility of f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , and h. In what follows, suppose that 1 ≤ j < j ′ ≤ 26, and we evaluate K1) )) I(20, X) = g2(f2(X ⊕ K1)) I(21, X) = g2(f2(h(X ⊕ K1))) I(4, X) = X ⊕ K2 I(9, X) = g1(f1(X ⊕ K2)) I(10, X) = g1(f2(X ⊕ K2)) I (15, 3  5  6  7  8  11  12  13  14  18 19 20 21 Case j, j ′ ∈ J 1 . There are 14 elements in J 1 , and hence we have 91 combinations of (j, j ′ ) with j < j ′ . See Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 for the analysis. In the figures, we use the same notation as in Fig. 9 . That is, if z is a function in Fig. 20 or Fig. 21 which is of the form z = z ′ ⊕ z ′′ , then this stands for a function z ′ (K 1 ) ⊕ z ′′ (K 1 ). When z is of the form z = z ′ z ′′ , then this stands for a function z ′ (z ′′ (K 1 )). Recall that we define i as i(K 1 ) = K 1 . As an example, consider the case j = 3 and j ′ = 6. In this case we are interested in the event h(X ⊕ K 1 ) = g 1 (f 1 (h(X ′ ⊕ K 1 ))), where X and X ′ are n-bit constants. We see that the event is equivalent to K 1 ⊕ g 1 (f 1 (K 1 )) = Y for some constant Y , and Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 show the left hand side of the event. From the discussions in Sect. 4, the probability of this event is at most 1/2 n . One can verify that all these events, I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ ), are covered in Fig. 9 , and we thus have Pr[I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ )] ≤ 1/2 n in this case.
Case j ∈ J 1 and j ′ ∈ J 2 ∪ J 3 ∪ J 4 . We have Pr[I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ )] ≤ 1/2 n from the randomness of K 1 and the invertibility of f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , and h.
Case j, j ′ ∈ J 2 . We have Pr[I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ )] ≤ 1/2 n with exactly the same reasoning in the analysis of Case j, j ′ ∈ J 1 .
Case j ∈ J 2 and j ′ ∈ J 3 ∪ J 4 . We have Pr[I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ )] ≤ 1/2 n from the randomness of K 2 and the invertibility of f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , and g 2 .
Case j, j ′ ∈ J 3 . We have Pr[I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ )] ≤ 1/2 n form the analysis of Case j, j ′ ∈ J 1 . Algorithm HASH3 * F 1 ,...,F 4 (N, A)
if a ≥ 3 then 14.
for i ← 3 to a − 1 do // only for a ≥ 4 15. Case j ∈ J 3 and j ′ ∈ J 4 . We have Pr[I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ )] = 1/2 n from the randomness of K 3 and the invertibility of f 1 and f 2 .
Case j, j ′ ∈ J 4 . This case corresponds to (j, j ′ ) = (1, 17) , and Pr[I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ )] = 0 holds.
Finally, we evaluate the probability of the bad event. For any two distinct queries (j, X), (j ′ , X ′ ) ∈ {(j 1 , X 1 ), . . . , (j q , X q )}, we have Pr [I(j, X) = I(j ′ , X ′ )] ≤ 1/2 n . Therefore, we obtain
C Proof of Lemma 2
We consider the following partition of
Without loss of generality, assume that the adversary B makes exactlyueries. We write theueries as (j 1 , N 1 , A 1 ), . . . , (j q , N q , A q ). Suppose that B interacts with HASH3, HASH3 ′ , and HASH3 ′′ , and we say that a bad event occurs and write B HASH3(·,·),HASH3 ′ (·,·),HASH3 ′′ (·,·) sets bad, if there exist two distinct queries (j, N, A),
where HASH3 * is defined in Fig. 22 . It takes N and A as input, and HASH3 * is designed to output the input value of the last invocation of the random function in HASH3, HASH3 ′ , or HASH3 ′′ . The absence of the bad event implies that the responses that B receives from the oracles are uniform and independent random bit strings. Therefore, we have
We also see that, from the argument above, the adaptivity does not help in increasing the probability of the bad event. Therefore, we may fix all queries (j 1 , N 1 , A 1 ), . . . , (j q , N q , A q ) made by B, and evaluate the right hand side of (9) based on the randomness of F 1 , . . . ,
CLOC for some 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 6. We evaluate
in the following six cases depending on the value of 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 6.
holds, and thus (10) = 0. If A ̸ = A ′ , then we have 
Case A, A ′ ∈ A
(2) CLOC . If A = A ′ , then we have h −1 (ozp(N )) ̸ = h −1 (ozp(N ′ )) from N ̸ = N ′ . Therefore,
and we have (10) = 0. If A ̸ = A ′ , then we have (10) = 1/2 n from fix0(ozp(A[1])) ̸ = fix0(ozp(A ′ [1])).
CLOC . By following the analysis of Case A, A ′ ∈ A
CLOC , we have (10) = 0 if A = A ′ , and
CLOC . Similarly, by following the analysis of Case A, A ′ ∈ A
(2) CLOC , we have (10) = 0 if A = A ′ , and (10)
Case A, A ′ ∈ A (5) CLOC . This case is more involved to analyze, and we first introduce a lemma to analyze this case. Let M, M ′ ∈ {0, 1} * be two distinct strings such that |M | = mn and |M ′ | = m ′ n for m, m ′ ≥ 1. We make use of the following lemma shown by Black and Rogaway [15] .
Lemma 5 ([15]
). Pr [COLL F (M, M ′ )] ≤ mm ′ /2 n + max{m, m ′ }/2 n , where the probability is taken over F $ ← Rand(n).
Algorithm PRF4 HASH4 ′ ,HASH4 ′′ ,F 24 ,F 25 ,F 26 (N, A, C) 1. if |C| = 0 then 2.
T ← HASH4 ′ (N, A) 3. else // |C| ≥ 1 4.
S P [0] ← HASH4 ′′ (N, A) 5.
T ← PRF4 ′ F 24 ,F 25 
D Proof of Lemma 3
For reference, we present the specification of PRF4 in Fig. 23 .
Without loss of generality, we assume that B makes exactlyueries, and we write the queries as (N 1 , A 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (N q , A q , C q ). Consider the case where B interacts with PRF4, and we say that a bad event occurs and write B PRF4(·,·,·) sets bad, if there exist two distinct queries (N, A, C), (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ ) ∈ {(N 1 , A 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (N q , A q , C q )} such that (N, A, C) ,
) is the input value for (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ ). The absence of the bad event implies that the responses that A receives are random bit strings, and we thus have 
Since the adaptivity does not help in increasing the probability of the bad event, we fix all queries (N 1 , A 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (N q , A q , C q ) and evaluate Pr [ B PRF4(·,·,·) sets bad ] . To evaluate the probability, we first focus on two distinct queries (N, A, C), (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ ) ∈ {(N 1 , A 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (N 
We see that ( 
We have (18) = 1/2 n from the randomness of HASH4 ′′ , and (19) ≤ mm ′ /2 n + max{m, m ′ }/2 n from Lemma 5. We now evaluate the probability of the bad event. For any two distinct queries (N, A, C), (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ ) ∈ { (N 1 , A 1 , C 1 ) , . . . , (N q , A q , C q )}, we have Pr [I[m] = I ′ [m ′ ]] ≤ 1/2 n + mm ′ /2 n + max{m, m ′ }/2 n . By writing the partition of C i as (C i [1] , . . . , C i [m i ]), we obtain
We note that the last inequality follows from [15, Theorem 4] . ⊓ ⊔
E Proof of Lemma 4
Privacy of CLOC5. We first analyze the privacy of CLOC5. Consider the case where A interacts with CLOC5-E, and let (N i , A i , M i ) be the i-th query, and (C i , T i ) be the response, where (C i [1] , . . . , C i [m i ]) n ← C i . Let I i = {fix1(C i [1] ), . . . , fix1(C i [m i − 1])}, i.e., I i is the set of input values of F 17 for the i-th query. We say that a bad event occurs and write A CLOC5-E(·,·,·) sets bad if, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ q and 1 ≤ j ≤ m i −1, we have
If (20) holds, then we say that fix1(C i [j]) causes the bad event. That is, the bad event occurs if fix1(C i [j]) collides with a previously used input value of F 17 . We see that the absence of the bad event implies that the responses that A receives are uniform random bit strings, and we thus have
